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The Zoning of Adult Entertainment: How
Far Can Planning Commissions Go?
By RAYMOND H. AVER*
I
Introduction
The bitter debate in America over adult entertainment' is
more than a century old. Proponents of adult entertainment
claim it is a healthy release for fantasies, a useful tool to com-
bat outdated Puritan values, and "an informal part of the na-
tion's sex-education program."2  Opponents of adult
entertainment argue that it is a degenerating force adversely
affecting society's morals. Despite the intensity of debate over
its value, it cannot be denied that adult entertainment is a rap-
idly expanding multibillion dollar business.' The rapid growth
of adult entertainment4 combined with the legal and judicial
difficulties in setting forth objective and manageable standards
to enable the trier of fact to distinguish protected speech from
unprotected obscenity' have led to attempts to regulate the
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1980.
1. Adult entertainment as defined in the various zoning ordinances includes:
adult bookstores, newsracks, motion picture theaters, motion picture arcades, caba-
rets, massage parlors, model studios, outcall services, and bath houses.
2. TME, April 5, 1976, at 62.
3. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1981, at Bl, col. 3.
4. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 24, 1982, at 67, col. 1.
5. Speech or expression which is judicially determined to be obscene is outside
first amendment protection and may be regulated, and even prohibited. Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The present constitutional obscenity standard was formu-
lated in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), which requires that state regulation
of obscenity be limited to hard core sexual conduct defined by the following basic
guidelines: "(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest...
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." But, the Court has
been unable to meet the practical problem of establishing administrable standards
which separate unprotected obscenity from other sexually oriented but constitution-
ally protected forms of expression. The ineffectiveness of obscenity laws in stemming
the proliferation of adult entertainment has led to the use of zoning ordinances in an
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proliferation of adult fare through restrictive zoning.6
The principal Supreme Court case sustaining restrictive zon-
ing, Young v. American Mini Theaters,7 upheld a Detroit ordi-
nance permitting cities to regulate adult entertainment
through the use of zoning powers. Many municipalities saw
Young8 as enabling them to bar adult entertainment or at least
to severely limit its possible locations;9 consequently, many
cities adopted zoning ordinances patterned after the Young
regulation. However, these recently enacted ordinances seem
to be more restrictive than the ordinance upheld in Young.
Moreover, several cities have passed zoning moratoria prohib-
iting the establishment of any new adult uses for specified pe-
riods of time. 10 These moratoria, which allow cities to study
the effects of various adult entertainment regulations, have ef-
fectively barred the establishment of any new adult entertain-
ment facilities.
This note discusses the deference given by the courts to zon-
ing ordinances adopted by localities throughout the United
States. The note then examines the impact upon the zoning of
adult entertainment due to the Young decision. This discus-
sion will devote special attention to the particular ordinances
and moratoria passed in response to Young. An examination
of the cases after Young follows with particular attention fo-
cused on the analysis employed by those courts in reaching
their respective decisions. A typical California zoning ordi-
nance and moratorium are then examined in an attempt to ap-
ply the factors which a court should take into account when
determining whether a zoning measure is constitutional. The
note concludes by exploring how a court should decide claims
of unconstitutionality involving the zoning of adult
establishments.
effort to regulate adult speech, some of which is non-obscene and therefore protected
by the first amendment.
6. See, e.g., DETROrr, MICH., ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 32.0007, 62.0000, 66.0103 (1972).
Cities throughout the United States have enacted similar ordinances which are dis-
cussed in this note.
7. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
8. For a discussion of Young, see infra note 38.
9. See, e.g., LONG BEACH, CALIF., MUNICIPAL CODE § 9120.41 (1977).
10. California cities that have adopted the moratoria include: Duarte, La Mirada,
Los Angeles City and County (which has enacted a more limited moratorium),
Merced, Pomona, Rosemead, and San Luis Obispo. See also Basiardanes v. City of
Galveston, 514 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
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II
The Foundation of the Municipalities' Power to
Zone
Zoning ordinances are designed to regulate the complexities
of modern land usage by separating incompatible uses, by lim-
iting the density and scale of various neighborhoods, and by
prohibiting or restricting the development of underdeveloped
lands. Under a zoning system, every type of land use is classi-
fied with regard to its benefits and its harmful effects. Uses are
then allowed to locate in areas where their benefits to society
are maximized and prohibited where their harmful effects out-
weigh the benefits."
Localities usually wield the zoning authority pursuant to an
express delegation of the states' police power. 2 In essence,
zoning consists of the division of a locality into districts and
the imposition of prospective restrictions upon the use of land
within those districts.' 3 The most common type of zoning ordi-
nance permits uses within a district which have a "cumulative"
character; for example, in a district zoned for light industry or
commercial enterprises, less intensive uses-such as resi-
dences-are permitted, while more intensive uses like heavy
industry are prohibited. 4
While government has been involved in the regulation of
land uses throughout American history, 5 zoning as it is under-
stood today became important when large urban centers began
to develop.' 6 Rapid industrial growth combined with a great
expansion in population created substantial property conflicts,
as industrial concentration began to deprive city dwellers of
quiet, sunlight, clean air, and other amenities. The earliest
zoning ordinances sought to control the area and heights of
buildings. 7 The courts normally accepted such regulations as
11. See generally POWELL & RoHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 867 (1968).
12. See Note, State Land Use Regulation-A Survey of Recent Legislative Ap-
proaches, 56 MINN. L REV. 869, 869-70 (1972).
13. R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.13 (2d ed. 1976).
14. Id. at § 9.14.
15. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKNG ISSUE 82-104 (1973).
16. As Justice Sutherland noted in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 386-7 (1926), "[u] ntil recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with
the great increase and concentration of population, problems have developed, and con-
stantly are developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restric-
tions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities."
17. See, e.g., Act of May 23, 1898, ch. 452, 1898 Mass. Acts. 401 (repealed 1941); Act of
No. 2]
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consistent with the police power of states to provide for the
health, safety and welfare of their citizens.18
As time went on, however, zoning ordinances were extended
to include land-use restrictions. For example, in 1909, Los An-
geles enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance which desig-
nated districts corresponding to the uses allowed.' 9 Use
restrictions spread rapidly during the 1920's. In 1915, only five
cities had comprehensive zoning measures; ten years later
nearly five hundred had adopted such laws.20
Judicial acceptance of the constitutionality of use zoning was
mixed. Many courts upheld the constitutionality of use zon-
ing;21 however, a significant minority rejected it as a violation
of due process.22 In 1926, the Supreme Court affirmatively an-
swered the question regarding the constitutionality of compre-
hensive use zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.23
by upholding an ordinance which prohibited industrial and
commercial uses in residentially zoned districts. While the
Court's holding was narrows 4 the opinion did establish a pre-
sumption of validity regarding local ordinances. Before a zon-
ing ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, its provisions
must be shown to be "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, hav-
ing no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare. '25 This was the contemporary formulation
May 13, 1904, ch. 333, 1904 Mass. Acts 283 (repealed 1907); Act of June 6, 1885, ch. 454,
1885 N.Y. laws 763.
18. See, e.g., City of Bismarck v. Hughes, 53 N.D. 838, 208 N.W. 711 (1926); Piper v.
Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159 (1923); State ex rel. Westmister Presbyterian Church
v. Edgcomb, 108 Neb. 859, 189 N.W. 617 (1922); Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn.
357, 111 A. 354 (1920).
19. See Ex Parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 118 P. 714 (1911).
20. D. ERVIN, J. FITCH, R. GODWIN, W. SHEPARD & H. STOEVENER, LAND USE CON-
TROL: EVALUATING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EFFECTS 64 (1977).
21. See, e.g., City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925); Ware v. City of
Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 P. 99 (1923); State v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So.
440 (1923); Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 127 N.E. 525 (1920).
22, See, e.g., Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 128 A. 50 (1925); City of St. Louis v.
Evraiff, 301 Mo. 231, 256 S.W. 489 (1923); Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W.
513 (1921).
23. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
24. The Court held: "1It is enough for us to determine, as we do, that the ordi-
nance in its general scope and dominant features, so far as its provisions are here in-
volved, is a valid exercise of authority, leaving other provisions to be dealt with as
cases arise directly involving them." Id. at 397.
25. Id. at 395.
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of the legitimate aims of the states' police power.2" In the early
part of the twentieth century, however, the police power was
substantially less than it is today."
Evidenced by decisions such as Berman v. Parker,2 decided
in 1954, in which the Supreme Court held that land-use regula-
tions may promote values which "are spiritual as well as physi-
cal, aesthetic as well as monetary, '29 the concept of "general
welfare" upon which the police power is based has expanded.
The Court has therefore continued to give broad deference to
local zoning laws. This deference was clearly evidenced in Vil-
lage of Belle Terre v. Boraas,3 ° where the Court considered an
equal protection challenge to a zoning ordinance limiting the
occupancy of single-family dwellings to members of the same
family or to groups of not more than two unrelated persons.
The majority, finding that fundamental rights were not at
stake, applied the equal protection standard of "a rational rela-
tionship to a [permissible] state objective. 31
The decision in Belle Terre also broadened the concept of
"general welfare" to include "[a] quiet place where yards are
wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted .... 32 This
idea, that the police power is not limited to the elimination of
health and safety dangers, is a principal component of the
"quality of life" concept. First articulated by Professor Bick-
el,33 the principle that a community's effort in preserving the
26. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 548 (1923); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
27. Compare Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 113 (1928) with North Dakota
Pharmacy Bd. v. Snyder's Stores, 414 U.S. 156, 164-67 (1973); compare Adkins v. Chil-
dren's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
During the latter 1920's the Court struck down several state statutes on the ground that
they exceeded the states' police power. (See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928); Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923). Since 1928, however, the Court has never held that a zoning measure
exceeded the police power. (See cases cited in 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING
LAW app. 557-8 (1975); 1 id. at § 7.05 (1974).
28. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
29. Id. at 33.
30. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
31. Id. at 8 (Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,76 (1971)). Justice Marshall's dissent in Belle
Terre focused on the level of equal protection scrutiny applied by the court. The ordi-
nance, he concluded, burdened fundamental rights of association and privacy guaran-
teed by the first and fourteenth amendments, and therefore demanded the stricter tier
of equal protection analysis. Id. at 18.
32. Id. at 9.
33. 22 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 25-6 (1971), cited in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 59 (1973).
No. 21
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quality of life and the character of its neighborhoods is consti-
tutionally justified as a legitimate state interest was a major
factor in the Court's decision upholding the zoning ordinance
dispersing adult theaters in Young."
Yet the Court has also noted that the legislature's power is
not unfettered, because an ordinance which violates constitu-
tional guarantees, such as freedom of speech, is not a legiti-
mate exercise of the states' police power.3 5 An ordinance
which impinges on fundamental personal rights
can withstand constitutional scrutiny only upon a clear show-
ing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compel-
ling and substantial governmental interest . . . the onus of
demonstrating that no less intrusive means will adequately
protect the compelling state interest and that the challenged
statute is sufficiently narrowly drawn, is upon the party seek-
ing to justify the burden.36
III
Young and Its Effect Upon Zoning of Adult
Entertainment
A. Zoning Ordinances
In Young v. American Mini Theaters,37 the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a Detroit zoning ordinance
which prohibited any adult facility from locating within 1,000
feet of any two other regulated establishments. 38 The Court's
34. 427 U.S. 50, 73 (1976).
35. "[TJhe police power, broad as it is, cannot justify the passage of a law or ordi-
nance which runs counter to the limitations of the Federal Constitution." Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917), in which the Court invalidated a municipal ordinance
which barred a person of one race from acquiring property on a block where the major-
ity of homes were already occupied by persons of another race. The Court found that
the "attempt to prevent the alienation of the property ... was not a legitimate exercise
of the police power of the State, and is in direct violation of ... the Fourteenth
Amendment (due process guarantee)." Id. at 82.
36. Village of Belie Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 18 (1974).
37. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
38. The challenged ordinances were the amended version of the "Anti-Skid Row
Ordinance" adopted by Detroit in an effort to prevent the concentration of certain
property uses which were felt to adversely affect the surrounding neighborhood. De-
troit, Mich., Ordinance 742-G (Nov. 2,1972) (amending OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE OF
THE CrrY OF DETROrr §§ 32.007, 66.0000, 66.0101 (1962)), discussed in 427 U.S. at 52-4.
Specifically, the ordinance provides that an adult theater may not be located within
1000 feet of any two other regulated uses. The "regulated uses" include-in addition to
adult bookstores-adult theaters and mini-theaters, bars, cabarets, hotels, pawnshops,
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decision, a plurality opinion authored by Justice Stevens,39 was
based on the availability of adult theaters in the area,40 the
slight impact on the number of adult businesses,4 and the
city's interest in preserving the quality of its neighborhoods.'
This decision had an immediate and enormous impact as city
officials across the country construed it as a green light to en-
act "Detroit-type" ordinances in their effort to curb the
proliferation of adult entertainment.43 Apparently, many of
billiard and pool halls, public lodging houses, secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors,
and taxi dance halls.
Respondents, operators of two adult motion picture theaters, sought relief claiming
that the ordinances violated their rights under the first and fourteenth amendments.
They argued that the ordinances were invalid on three grounds: first, they were uncon-
stitutionally vague in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment;
second, they constituted an impermissible prior restraint upon first amendment ex-
pression; and third, the classification of theaters solely on the basis of the content of
the films exhibited violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 58.
The Supreme Court held the Detroit ordinance immune from constitutional attacks
based on either the first or the fourteenth amendments. The Court dismissed the
claim that the ordinance was so vague as to constitute a violation of due process of law
by simply recognizing that respondent theater operators ran businesses that unques-
tionally fell under the ordinances category of adult theaters. Id. at 58-9. The Court
also recognized the respondent's prior restraint argument. Id. at 62. Because the re-
spondents did not argue that the ordinance limited the number of adult theaters in the
city of Detroit, or that it denied the public access to adult entertainment, the Court
concluded that the market for adult entertainment was essentially unrestrained. Id.
Finally, the Court rejected the theater operators' equal protection claim by accepting
the Detroit Common Council's determination that a concentration of adult theaters,
unlike a concentration of non-adult theaters, caused neighborhood deterioration. Id.
at 71 n.34. The Common Council apparently relied on the evidence presented by Dr.
Mel Ravitz, a sociology professor at Wayne State University. See Nortown Theatre,
Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 365 (E.D. Mich. 1974). The Court also placed great
emphasis on the record which the Court stated disclosed a "factual basis" that the
Detroit ordinance would help curtail the adverse effects of a concentration of adult
uses. 427 U.S. at 71. In conclusion, the Court noted that the burden on first amend-
ment speech is slight because the ordinance does not suppress, or greatly restrict ac-
cess to adult speech. 427 U.S. at 71 n.35. If it had, the situation would be quite different,
the Court announced.
39. Only four members of the Court (Justice Powell did not concur with this part
of the majority opinion) held as constitutional the classification of theaters and book-
stores based on the content of the materials displayed at such establishments.
40. The Young opinion emphasized that the respondents did not challenge the or-
dinance as denying distributors or exhibitors (of adult fare) access to the market, or
that the viewer is unable to find adult theaters in the city. 427 U.S. at 62.
41. The Court determined that the ordinance did not greatly limit access to adult
movies, but only regulated the location where they could be shown, so the burden on
first amendment rights was "slight." Id. at 62, 71 n.35.
42. Id. at 71 n.34.
43. Some of the major cities which enacted Detroit type ordinances included: At-
lanta, Atlantic City, Galveston, Jacksonville, Kansas City and Minneapolis.
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these urban planners interpreted Young as approving adult
use zoning, or at least deconcentration plans, as constitution-
ally acceptable in nearly all circumstances.
1. Ordinances Passed in Response to Young
In California, for example, San Jose was the first city to
adopt a zoning ordinance patterned after the Detroit ordi-
nance.44 The San Jose ordinance prohibits any two adult es-
tablishments including public cardrooms, dance halls and
massage parlors from locating within 1,000 feet of one an-
other.45 This type of regulation mirrors the ordinance upheld in
Young. The San Jose ordinances go further,46 however, by
prohibiting an adult establishment from locating within 1,000
feet from any residentially zoned areas, any hotel, motel, pub-
lic eating establishment, lodging house, school, college or uni-
versity.47 This additional footage restriction naturally places a
further limitation on the areas in which an adult establishment
may locate."
Many municipalities have enacted 500 foot residential re-
strictions.49  Some have sought to amortize non-conforming
uses, unlike the ordinance at issue in Young, which ex-
44. SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 20.08.090, 20.08.100 (1977).
45. SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL CODE § 20.08.090 (1977).
46. The Supreme Court's holding in Young was limited to upholding DETROIT
MICH. ORDINANCE Nos. 742-G (§ 66.0000) and 742-G (§ 32.0007) (1972), and did not in-
clude the 500 foot prohibition from any residentially zoned property, which had been
held invalid at the district court level in Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp.
363 (1974).
47. SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL CODE § 20.08.100 (1977).
48. In California, the limitation upon possible adult locations caused by the addi-
tional residential restriction may be even greater because most areas are zoned strip
commercial. Strip commercial zones normally consist of a ribbon of commercial and
manufacturing uses fronting both sides of an arterial roadway and extending inward
for half a block. These strips are entirely surrounded by residentially zoned side
streets. While the size of commercial strips vary greatly, areas within the strip which
could serve as possible adult locations are often within 500 feet of residentially zoned
locations. Therefore, under the San Jose ordinance those possible locations would be
prohibited because they would be within 1,000 feet of a residentially zoned district.
49. See, e.g., MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 540.410(b) (2) (1977); TEXAS CODE ch. 25
(1960) (adopting Crr OF GALVESTON ZONING STANDARDS art. 2 § 25.10 (1971); JACKSON-
VILLE MUNICIPAL CODE § 410 (amending JACKSONVILLE ADULT ENTERTAINMENT AND
SERVICES CODE § 708.1202); CITY OF WYOMING, MICHIGAN ZONING CODE § 60.99(3) (g)
(1979); CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF ALLENTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA § 1362.04
(1977); LONG BEACH MUNICIPAL CODE, § 9120.41 (1977); and ATLANTA ZONING ORDI-
NANCE §§ 16-20002(34), 16-21003, 16-22003(a).
50. See, e.g., MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 540.410(f); ATLANTA ZONING ORDINANCE
§ 16-24004(9) (1976); N.C. SESS. LAWS ch. 987, § 2 (1977); MINOT, N. DAKOTA ORDINANCE
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empted existing establishments.5 ' Other cities have enacted li-
censing 2 requirements which augment the control of adult
uses through restrictive zoning. The problem is compounded
because each zoning ordinance is peculiar to the geography of
the particular area involved. This means the constitutionality
of a zoning ordinance must necessarily turn on the factual cir-
cumstances of each case, because a 1,000 foot restriction which
is constitutional for one area does not assure its validity in an-
other. Finally, most adult entertainment ordinances do not op-
erate in isolation since the adult uses are also subject to zoning
restrictions applicable to all commercial uses. Consequently,
one of the main unanswered questions following Young is
whether an ordinance, or combination of ordinances, make it
sufficiently unfeasible to provide adequate locations so as to
comply with the requirements set out in Young.
2. An Examination of the Cases Following Young
Perhaps the most restrictive ordinance upheld and justified
under Young was Minot, North Dakota's ordinance which re-
stricted the location of an "adult entertainment center"5 3 to
property located no closer than 1,250 feet from a church, school,
or any residentially zoned property. Relying on the district
court's findings that there remained available, under the ordi-
nance, "land which is equivalent in area to a combination of
many city blocks", 4 the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld
the ordinance because it did not have the effect of suppressing
or greatly restricting access to lawful speech. 5
No. 2336; ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF DALLAS No. 15269 (1976) (amending §§ 46-9.2 and
46-9.3 of ch. 46 'THEATERS," of the DALLAS CrrY CODE).
51. See R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 6.64, 6.66-.68 (2d ed. 1976).
Under the amortization approach, which has generally been limited to highly obnox-
ious uses, the use is assigned a period of permitted non-conformity during which time
it may continue to exist and function, but at the expiration of that time, it must termi-
nate. Critical to the validity of an amortization provision is the adequacy of the amorti-
zation period, which will vary depending on the use to be amortized.
52. Generally a licensing ordinance allows a municipal official to decide, guided by
various specific standards, whether to grant a license. See, e.g., NEw JERSEY S.A.
§ 2(A)(3) (1980); MINOT, N. DAKOTA ORD. No. 2337 (1979).
53. Ordinance No. 2336 includes as its definition of "adult entertainment center":
adult bookstore or adult cinema.
54. City of Minot v. Central Ave. News, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 851, 864 (N.D. 1981).
55. Id. at 863-5.
No. 21
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(a) Economic Viability as a Factor
Unfortunately, the opinion failed to mention whether the
available sites were economically feasible. Nor did the opinion
mention whether the city council had found any specific evi-
dence as to the effect of Central's adult entertainment center5 6
on the surrounding area. Furthermore, the court failed to ad-
dress whether there was an adequate "factual basis" for the
council's conclusion that the ordinance would rectify the al-
leged problems caused by an adult establishment, or whether
the city council's reason for enacting the ordinance, only after
they became aware of Central's opening, was constitutional
and not merely an attempt to prevent exhibition and sale of
sexually oriented material in Minot. Finally, the court appar-
ently disregarded established equal protection scrutiny of ordi-
nances that interfere with protected speech.57
Three district court cases, however, have discussed the com-
mercial viability issue. Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson 8 demon-
strates the importance of a commercial viability inquiry. There
the city contended that there were no less than eighty-one
sites available, under the ordinance at issue, for adult en-
tertainment establishments.59 The court, after an examination
of the maps, documents, photographs and testimony, found
that all but ten of the eighty-one sites were "wholly unaccept-
able" as adult entertainment sites.6" The court did not address
the viability issue directly in holding the ordinance unconstitu-
56. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 54 (1976).
57. The court cited from another North Dakota case: "unless the statute or ordi-
nances are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals or public welfare" the legislative judgment must prevail.
308 N.W.2d at 858. This standard is popularly known as the "minimal scrutiny" stan-
dard, and is employed by courts when a statutory classification involves economic or
social legislation. When the classification is based upon suspect criteria or serves to
restrict the exercise of a fundamental right, however, the classification is examined
under the second tier, strict scrutiny, and is upheld only if it is closely tailored to the
state objective, which must be compelling, and there are no reasonable, alternative
means available which would have less of an impact on fundamental rights.
58. 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
59. Id. at 1216.
60. Id. at 1216-7. Of the 81 sites, some were not acceptable because they conflicted
with other ordinances, others were wholly unsuited for retail use because of size or
shape of the lot, two sites had easements, several were below street level making them
commercially useless, a substantial number were on larger tracts of land whose own-
ers were unwilling to break up the parcel, some owners would not sell to another retail
business, or adult business, a few sites were not very accessible to automobile traffic,
and a large number were not available and would not be available for some time.
[Vol. 5
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tional, but in its analysis of the ordinance's effect cited such
factors as unsuitability for retail or commercial use and non-
accessability to automobile traffic suggesting that an ordinance
which primarily restricts adult uses to commercially non-via-
ble sites would not be upheld.
In Alexander v. City of Minneapolis6 the court stated that
"economic and practical realities cannot be ignored in evaluat-
ing the actual effect of [an] ordinance."6 2 The court heard tes-
timony from a number of witnesses with considerable
experience in adult businesses. They testified that in order to
maintain a successful adult business it must be located near
other retail businesses which were close to vehicular and pe-
destrian traffic in well-lighted areas. Consequently, much of
the fifty to sixty-five block area of downtown Minneapolis,
available for adult businesses under the ordinance, was not
suitable for a retail business. Economic viability was thus a
major factor in the court's decision declaring the ordinance
unconstitutional.
The only case which referred to Young itself for guidance re-
garding the commercial viability issue was Basiardanes v. City
of Galveston .63 There an adult theater exhibitor testified that
the Galveston ordinance "would exclude virtually all 'commer-
cially viable' sites."' Analyzing the issue, the court noted that
while Young prohibited any meaningful restriction upon adult
businesses, it did not provide that they would be exempt from
certain economic burdens. Citing to Young, the court summa-
rized its ruling, "if the ordinance leaves room enough for those
who wish to exhibit erotic movies for profit to find ample area
to do so, although not at the choice commercial sites, and for
those who seek such fare to have easy access to it, then the
ordinance strikes at the pocket book not at the Constitution
.... "6 Therefore, even under Young the constitutionality of
an ordinance should not be determined without at least consid-
ering the issue of commercial viability. The court must look
beyond whether a particular ordinance allows adult busi-
nesses to locate in many sites because if those sites are not
61. 531 F. Supp. 1162 (D. Minn. 1982).
62. Id. at 1172.
63. 514 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
64. Id. at 981.
65. Id. at 982.
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commercially viable, adult businesses will not locate there re-
sulting in a limitation upon protected speech.
(b) Other Important Factors
In addition to its failure to mention the economic viability
issue, the court in Minot failed to address three other criteria
which the Supreme Court had emphasized in Young. First,
there was specific evidence presented to the Court in Young of
the adverse effect upon the surrounding neighborhood caused
by the adult establishments.66
Second, the Detroit ordinance was motivated by a desire to
eliminate the adverse effects and not because of a "distaste"
for adult speech. 67 Third, the Detroit Common Council was
able to demonstrate an adequate "factual basis" for its conclu-
sion that the ordinance would help curtail the adverse effects.
68
i. Specific evidence of adverse effects
Several cases have emphasized the necessity that propo-
nents of adult ordinances must present specific evidence dem-
onstrating the adverse effects of adult establishments. 69 For
example, in Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor7 ° an or-
dinance prohibiting adult theaters within 500 feet of any busi-
ness licensed to sell liquor, a church or a school, or within 250
feet of property zoned for residential use was ruled unconstitu-
tional, in part because the court determined that the city had
not presented any factual support either in the legislative pro-
cess prior to enactment or during litigation, of blight or traffic
control difficulties caused by adult establishments. In Avalon
Cinema Corporation v. Thompson ,71 the court noted that find-
ings of adverse effects were a critical factor in the analysis em-
ployed in Young .72 Holding a North Little Rock ordinance
unconstitutional, the federal court emphasized that the ordi-
nance was not based on a demonstrated past history of deterio-
66. 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34.
67. Id. at 67 (plurality opinion); id. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 71 (plurality opinion); id. at 82 (Powell, J., concurring).
69. See, e.g., Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981); Keego
Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981); CLR Corp. v. Henline,
520 F. Supp. 760 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Ellwest Stereo Theaters, Inc. of Texas v. Byrd, 472
F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
70. 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981).
71. 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981).
72. Id. at 661.
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ration caused by adult uses or on any studies by social
scientists as was done in Young.
ii. Motivation behind the ordinance
The second criterion, noted above, was also relied upon by
the court in the Avalon Cinema case.73 Stating that the North
Little Rock ordinance must meet the standards set forth in the
"Powell Concurrence" as well as the plurality opinion (be-
cause neither analysis in Young commanded a majority), the
court found that the ordinance failed the third prong of the
O'Brien test 74 because the ordinance was enacted by the city
council only after they were informed of the impending open-
ing of the adult theater.75 Similarly, the court in Entertainment
Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski,76 invalidated an ordinance
which sought to prohibit, through the use of zoning, the only
adult movie theater in the city. In fact, the village council ad-
mitted it had enacted the ordinance to regulate adult movies;
therefore, this case is also of note as an example of how some
planning councils have gone beyond Young in an attempt to
severely restrict adult establishments.
73. Id. at 662.
74. Justice Powell's concurrence in Young, upholding the Detroit ordinance, was
based upon testimony that the concentration of several adult theaters caused the
neighborhood to deteriorate. It was Justice Powell's opinion that it was appropriate to
analyze the ordinance under the four-part test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968). In upholding O'Brien's conviction for draftcard burning, the Court con-
cluded that where "speech" and "non-speech" elements of conduct were combined, an
overriding governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element would justify
an incidental burden on the speech notwithstanding the guarantee of the first amend-
ment.
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court propounded a four-part test to determine
whether a government regulation which infringed on speech protected by the first
amendment was sufficiently justified:
(1) was it within the government's constitutional power;
(2) did it further an important or substantial government interest;
(3) was the governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression; and
(4) was the burden on first amendment freedoms no greater than necessary
to further the governmental interest.
Upon finding that the Detroit ordinance satisfied each of these elements, Justice
Powell upheld the zoning scheme concluding that the ordinance did not interfere with
content, but rather was a restriction solely upon the location where adult speech may
be presented. 427 U.S. at 79-80.
75. An ordinance regulating the location of adult businesses must be enacted to
prevent an undesirable secondary effect caused by the establishment, and not merely
because of distaste for adult fare, to pass the third prong of the O'Brien test. Id. at 80-
82.
76. 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980).
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iii. Factual basis for conclusion that the ordinance will
ameliorate the specific problem
Many of the cases which have sought to follow the Young
guidelines in examining the constitutionality of the adult re-
strictions before them, did not mention the "factual basis" cri-
terion noted above. This can be explained, however, as many
of the ordinances were found to be unconstitutional under
other criteria; consequently, the courts did not have to reach
the "factual basis" issue. One recent Supreme Court case,
however, did discuss the "factual basis" issue. In Schad v. Bor-
ough of Mount Ephraim7 7 the Court held the challenged ordi-
nance unconstitutional based primarily on the Borough's
failure to adequately justify the substantial restriction of a pro-
tected liberty.78
In addition to the discussion of the "factual basis" issue, the
Court also set out the equal protection analysis to be applied in
testing adult zoning ordinances under varying circumstances.
Noting that while the zoning power, as a means to achieving a
"satisfactory" quality of life, is broad and therefore upheld in
most cases following minimal scrutiny, the level of scrutiny is
substantially increased when a zoning ordinance encroaches
upon a protected liberty. If such is the case, the ordinance
"must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently sub-
stantial government interest. '79
While this formulation of the equal protection doctrine does
not contain the exact language of strict scrutiny, a compelling
77. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). In Schad, the Court in a seven-to-two decision held that a
zoning ordinance prohibiting all forms of live entertainment in commercial areas vio-
lated the first and fourteenth amendments.
78. Id. at 72-6. The Borough had sought to justify the ordinance on the grounds
that it was part of the city's plan to create a commercial zone which would cater to its
citizen's "immediate needs," that problems, such as parking, trash, police protection
and medical facilities were exacerbated due to live entertainment establishments, that
the ordinance was a reasonable time, place and manner restriction furthering the Bor-
ough's interest. The Court found no evidence to support the Borough's first justifica-
tion, as various uses were permitted which were far in excess of what would normally
be considered to be "immediate needs" of a resident. As to the second contention, the
Court noted that the Borough had presented no evidence that live entertainment
posed problems with respect to parking, trash, police protection, and medical facilities
more serious than those posed by permitted uses or that the city's interests could not
be met by less intrusive restrictions on protected expression. The Court also dis-
missed the third justification, holding that the ordinance was not a reasonable time,
place and manner restriction, pointing out that the Borough had not shown that its
interests required the exclusion of all live entertainment.
79. Id. at 68.
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government interest, the cases cited and the language chosen
from those cases in support of the Court's formulation cer-
tainly seem to indicate that strict scrutiny should be applied
where an ordinance results in incidental restrictions upon pro-
tected speech.
B. Zoning Moratoria
In addition to the passage of zoning ordinances which ex-
tended Young, several cities have passed zoning moratoria. 80
These moratoria are justified as urgency measures to study the
possibilities of various contemplated zoning proposals.8 For
example, La Mirada, California, passed a moratorium which
stated: "There is a need to study and determine appropriate
standards of proximity of 'adult businesses' to residential ar-
eas, hospitals, schools, parks and public buildings as well as
standards of noise and traffic. .-. and determine in which zone
or zones . . . "'adult businesses' shall be permitted."82 The
moratoria are essentially zoning ordinances which, in Califor-
nia, last for four months but which can be extended for up to
two years provided that notice is given and a public hearing is
held pursuant to section 65858 of the California Government
Code.83 During the period of the moratoria no new adult busi-
nesses may be established.
The practical effect of these moratoria is exemplified by ex-
amining the process of obtaining a business license. Once a
suitable location is found for an adult business, an individual
must obtain a business license from the city planning depart-
ment in order to legally conduct his business. The business
license application will require the entrepreneur to state the
type and proposed location of the business. Assuming a mora-
80. See, e.g., ORDINANCE No. 284 "An Urgency Ordinance of the City of La Mirada
Pursuant to Government Code Section 65858 a Moratorium on the Construction, Devel-
opment and Operation of Adult Motion Picture Theaters, Adult Theaters, Model Stu-
dios, Picture Arcades, Adult Bookstores, Massage Parlors and Other 'Adult
Businesses.'
81. Id. "Without following the otherwise required preliminaries to the adoption of
a zoning ordinance, the legislative body, to protect the public safety, health and wel-
fare, may adopt as an urgency measure an interim ordinance prohibiting any uses
which may be in conflict with a contemplated zoning proposal which the legislative
body, planning commission of the planning department is considering or studying or
intends to study within a reasonable time ......
82. Id.




torium is in effect when he applies for the license, his request
will be denied due to the urgency measure. Therefore, prior to
the termination of the interim ordinance, planning officials
could compile a list of proposed adult business locations by
simply examining recent license applications.8 4 Planning offi-
cials could then pass zoning ordinances prohibiting adult busi-
nesses from locating at the applied-for sites. It is more likely,
however, that by the time the moratorium period expires the
entrepreneur will have had to change his plans due to eco-
nomic necessity or because the land will have been sold.
Therefore, the moratorium can effectively limit the establish-
ment of any new adult business.
The critical issue in determining the constitutionality of the
California moratorium is whether the state interest served in
drafting sound zoning ordinances through longer study justi-
fies the temporary total ban on speech protected by the first
amendment. These moratoria have been held unconstitutional
in at least two unpublished opinions of the Los Angeles Supe-
rior Court.8" In People v. E. W.A.P., Inc. ,86 the court stated that
reliance on Young as authority for the claim that the morato-
rium is constitutional is misplaced. Noting that Young allows
cities to reasonably regulate adult businesses, the court
seemed to imply that moratoria are unreasonable. "No matter
what the reason or purpose is, a city cannot so prohibit such
activity."87 The court cited People ex rel. Busch v. Projection
Room Theater8 8 as the leading California case. Projection
Room Theater held that the closing of adult establishments,
either temporarily or permanently, was an impermissible vio-
lation of the United States Constitution. Consequently, the
court held the moratorium invalid and therefore void.89
84. See, e.g., Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 514 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
85. People v. E.W.A.P., Inc., Nos. CR A-16255, 16256 (1978) and E.W.A.P., Inc. v. City
of La Mirada, L.A. Sup. Ct. No. 30911.
86. People v. E.W.A.P., Inc., Nos. CR A-16255, 16256, at 3.
87. Id.
88. 17 Cal. 3d 42, 62 (1976).
89. People v. E.W.A.P., Inc. Nos. CR A-16255, 16256, at 3.
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IV
How Courts Should Decide Claims of
Unconstitutionality Involving the Zoning
of Adult Establishments
A. Zoning Ordinances
The tension between a municipality's power to zone and the
protection given to free expression by the first and fourteenth
amendments constitutes the crucial aspect of all cases in
which a locality seeks to zone adult uses. Both the power to
zone, which is a preferred legislative power, and the freedom of
expression, which is a preferred power protected by the legis-
lature, are essential to a nation which emphasizes democratic
ideals and the quality of life of its citizenry. The issue, thus,
becomes how much latitude will the court allow a municipality
seeking to zone adult business, protected by the first and four-
teenth amendments, due to its belief that such restrictions pro-
mote the public welfare of its residents. This issue is of critical
importance not only because of its effect upon adult entertain-
ment but also because of implications for all protected forms of
expression.
1. Important Factors in Determining the Constitutionality
of Adult Entertainment Zoning Ordinances
(a) Motivation Behind the Ordinance: Specific Evidence
of Adverse Effects
As with any type of zoning measure based on a legislative
classification, such as Detroit's classification of adult theaters,
the municipality must be able to meet an evidentiary burden of
justifying the ordinance as serving a legitimate state objective
and show that the classification is truly a means to the in-
tended result.9 Many of the zoning ordinances which seek to
regulate adult establishments justify the classification of adult
entertainment based upon city planners' perception that adult
facilities contribute to the blighting or downgrading of the sur-
rounding neighborhood. It is therefore the city planners' belief
that dispersing adult establishments will preserve the quality
of life in their city's neighborhoods. In Young, there was spe-
cific legislative history and a factual background of expert
study to support the position that concentration of adult uses
90. 427 U.S. at 71.
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led to the decline of neighborhoods.9 1 Such specific evidence
should be considered a prerequisite by a court in its examina-
tion of an ordinance's constitutionality.
(b) Whether Access to This Form of Protected Speech is
Significantly Reduced
Even though a particular ordinance is adequately justified it
may still be struck down if the court decides the infringement
upon protected speech is greater than the public welfare which
the ordinance seeks to protect. If a particular ordinance
merely disperses adult establishments and does not have a sig-
nificant deterrent effect, suppressing or greatly restricting ac-
cess to lawful speech, Young has mandated that the ordinance
should be upheld as supportive of the city's effort in preserving
the quality of life of its neighborhoods. If the ordinance places
a burden on protected speech that is "real and substantial"
then a court should employ a stricter standard of judicial re-
view as set forth in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim.92
Thus, if a restriction substantially affects the number of adult
establishments or limits the public's access to this type of pro-
tected speech, the Schad analysis controls. If not, the ordi-
nance should be examined under the Young approach.
In determining whether an ordinance has a substantial im-
pact on free expression, a reviewing court should examine the
burden placed on the creator as well as the viewer.93 This
means economic viability should be a factor in considering
whether an ordinance reduces the number of locations where
an adult facility may be established. In addition, the varying
geographical layout of each city requires the determination be
made on a case by case basis.
(c) Factual Basis
Finally, assuming the ordinance is adequately justified and
does not have a substantial impact upon protected expression,
a reviewing court should require the governmental zoning au-
thority to demonstrate an adequate "factual basis" for its con-
clusion that the ordinance will in fact significantly reduce, if
91. See &upra note 38.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79 for a discussion of the Schad
standard.
93. 427 U.S. at 62.
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not eliminate, the adverse effects at which it is directed.94 In
addition, the burden of demonstrating that no less intrusive
means upon the protected speech will adequately protect the
state interest should be placed on the zoning authority.95 This
means a reviewing court should insist upon a fairly complete
record of the evidence that was available to the zoning author-
ity at the time it acted. Furthermore, the court should examine
the procedures under which the record was compiled in order
to confirm the reliability of the evidence on which the author-
ity acted and the inferences it drew. The court should also ex-
amine whether less intrusive restrictions such as regulation of
the hours during which an adult business may operate, or reg-
ulation of signs designating the building of an adult use would
adequately protect the state interest. In conclusion, only a
zoning ordinance passing each one of these criteria should be
upheld as constitutional by a reviewing court.
2. An Examination of a Current Zoning Ordinance Under
the Aforementioned Factors
Perhaps it would be most beneficial at this point to give a
concrete example of a typical California zoning ordinance,
which also exemplifies how far some zoning authorities have
taken the holding in Young, and examine it under the criteria
set out above.
Ordinance 295 of the city of La Mirada, recently amended on
April 8, 1980, is a typical example of a California adult en-
tertainment zoning ordinance. Section 21.53.010 and 21.53.020
set out the purpose, intent, and a listing of the various types of
adult businesses regulated under the ordinance which corre-
sponds to the ordinance upheld in Young. Because the justifi-
cation for the La Mirada ordinance is similar to the one upheld
in Young, it can be assumed, unless a court were to find that it
was enacted out of a distaste for adult speech, that the ordi-
nance would pass the first prong of analysis.
Testing to determine whether the ordinance places a sub-
stantial burden on protected speech is the next prong. Section
21.53.030 states that adult uses are permitted only in areas with
a C-4 zoning classification. Finally, sections 21.53.060 through
21.53.070 list the minimum spacing requirements: no adult use
94. Id. at 71.
95. Schad v. Borough of Mount Emphraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68, 69 n.7 (1981).
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shall be located within 1,000 feet of any other adult use, or
within 1,000 feet of any parcel of land containing an amuse-
ment park, a camp, church or other similar religious facility,
child care facility, community center, museum, park, play-
ground or school. In addition, no such establishment may be
located within 500 feet of any residentially zoned property, bar,
convalescent home, public hotel, hospital, nursing home, re-
tirement home, sanitarium or senior citizen activity center.
Upon examining a zoning map of the city of La Mirada, one
finds twenty-one areas, equal to less than one-tenth of the total
land space of the city, that are zoned C-4 and are thus accepta-
ble under the La Mirada ordinance as a possible location for an
adult entertainment business. Nineteen of the areas zoned C-4
are either within 500 feet of a residential area or a school
thereby eliminating them as possible locations. Of the remain-
ing two areas one is within 500 feet of a hospital. Therefore
only one area on the map, measuring a little over 3,000 feet in
length and 1,000 feet in width, which is completely surrounded
by residentially zoned property, might be a permissible
location.
Assuming an adult establishment is located in the permissi-
ble area, the court may find that it adequately serves the resi-
dents of La Mirada. If so, the court could uphold the
ordinance, using Young as precedent, as a legitimate exercise
of the city's police power. In order to uphold the ordinance
under Young, the court would have to find that the ordinance
did not have the effect of limiting the number or restricting the
public's access to this form of protected speech. Because
Young has stated that a city should be allowed to experiment
when confronted with a problem which affects the community
welfare, the court could justify the ordinance as supportive of
the city's effort in preserving "the quality of its urban life."
If the court were to determine the ordinance was adequately
justified and did not have a substantial impact upon protected
speech, it should then inquire as to whether an adequate "fac-
tual basis" can be demonstrated. On the other hand, if the
court found that the ordinance placed a substantial burden on
protected expression by greatly restricting the La Mirada resi-
dents' access to adult entertainment, the court should use
Schad to test the ordinance. Under Schad, the city of La
Mirada would have the difficult burden of not only proving that
their ordinance served a substantial government interest, but
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also that there were no less intrusive means.96 Although the
La Mirada ordinance is not a total ban of adult entertainment,
it could be argued that the effect of the ordinance is similar to a
total ban because there is only one acceptable location in the
city for an adult entertainment facility.
Opponents of the ordinance could call upon the findings
made by several major planning departments in California,
which examined the feasibility of the additional 500 foot re-
striction from residentially zoned areas and concluded that the
additional restriction would severely limit the number of adult
entertainment establishments." Furthermore, such a 500 foot
restriction was struck down by the district court in Young. 98
B. Zoning Moratoria
Zoning moratoria are somewhat different from zoning ordi-
nances, as they are temporary and constitute a total ban dur-
ing their effective period. In addition, the justification for
zoning moratoria is different from the justification for zoning
ordinances. Therefore, when analyzing a moratorium the court
must examine not only the effect of the moratorium upon pro-
tected speech, but must determine whether the city planners'
justification merits any actual infringement upon protected
rights.
As with zoning ordinances, the critical inquiry must be
whether the particular moratorium has more than an inciden-
tal effect upon protected expression. Ordinance 284 of the city
of La Mirada provides an appropriate example. It is an ur-
gency ordinance declaring a moratorium on the construction
and development of all adult business. Assuming for purposes
of this analysis that adult establishments existed in La Mirada
prior to the passage of the moratorium which are sufficient to
meet the demand of viewers who wish to buy adult products,
the court may determine that the moratorium has only a slight
effect upon adult speech as zoning moratoria only prohibit new
adult businesses from commencing operation and thus do not
affect pre-existing establishments.
96. Id. at 2182-3.
97. This has been the finding of a few major planning departments including the
cities of Los Angeles and San Francisco. See, e.g., Los ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF CITY
PLANNING, STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION OF ADULT ENTERTAINMENT IN
THE CITY OF LoS ANGELES 2 (1977).
98. See supra note 38.
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If no proof is presented showing that the moratorium had the
effect of suppressing or greatly restricting access to adult en-
tertainment, the moratorium might be upheld under the
Young rational. The court would still have to determine
whether the need to study various zoning proposals, the justifi-
cation articulated for most zoning moratoria, justified the in-
fringement, if any, upon protected expression. As zoning
measures have historically been given deferential treatment
by the Supreme Court, it is possible a court might uphold the
moratorium, even though it resulted in a total ban on protected
speech. The result could be rationalized as supporting the
city's effort in preserving the quality of life in its neighbor-
hoods combined with the fact that the ban would only be for a
short time and would not affect any pre-existing adult uses.
Typical municipal moratoria resemble the ordinances invali-
dated in Schad, because they are a total ban on adult en-
tertainment. However, such moratoria are only temporary
measures. 99 In addition, the moratoria do not affect pre-ex-
isting adult establishments or other live entertainment. But,
as noted above, these moratoria have been invalidated in at
least two unpublished opinions, prior to the ruling in Schad, by
the Los Angeles Superior Court.100 In one such case it was held
that no reason or purpose would justify a four month ban on
adult entertainment.101 If the reviewing court finds that a par-
ticular moratorium places a substantial burden on protected
expression, the court should use Schad to determine the con-
stitutionality of the restriction. As would be the case with any
other zoning measure, the city would then have the burden of
justifying the ordinance, of demonstrating that it served a sub-
stantial governmental interest, and of proving that the morato-
rium was narrowly drawn.102
V
Conclusion
Regardless of one's view concerning the benefits or detri-
ments of adult entertainment, because it is protected by the
first amendment, municipalities may not go beyond constitu-
99. While the moratoria are initially enacted for a period of four months, they can
be extended for up to two years. See supra text accompanying n.83.
100. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
101. See supra text accompanying note 87.
102. 452 U.S. at 68.
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tional parameters in seeking to improve their residents' quality
of life through zoning. Young v. American Mini Theaters is the
principal case in setting out those parameters. Many munici-
palities have sought to go beyond the parameters of Young
however, through zoning ordinances and moratoria. Because
this is an emerging area of the law questions still remain, and
until the Supreme Court answers those questions, planning
commissions must be careful in their drafting.
This note suggests several factors that planning commis-
sions and the courts should study when examining the consti-
tutionality of a particular ordinance. Through properly drafted
zoning ordinances the character of our neighborhoods can be
improved thereby enhancing the quality of our lives. This can
be accomplished while maintaining the democratic ideals of
free speech. Consequently, the tension between a municipal-
ity's power to zone and the protection afforded to free expres-
sion need not end in the loss of either desired objective.
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